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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-2792 
_____________ 
    
SHANE STADTMILLER 
Appellant 
                   
v. 
 
UPMC HEALTH PLAN, INC. 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-00884) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy F. Conti 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 6, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Shane Stadtmiller sued his former employer, UPMC Health Plan, Inc. (“UPMC”), 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12117, the 
2 
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794,1 and several other state common law causes 
of action.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of UPMC on 
Stadtmiller’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his 
state law claims.  Stadtmiller now appeals from the District Court's judgment on his ADA 
and RA claims.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to 
our decision.   
While serving in Iraq for the United States Army, Stadtmiller sustained hand and 
brain injuries; consequently, he now suffers from Traumatic Brain Injury and Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder.  Specifically, he has trouble concentrating, is sensitive to light 
and noise, and suffers anxiety when startled. 
After ending his tour and returning to the United States, Stadtmiller worked with a 
job placement service for veterans to find employment.  Through this service, he secured 
an interview with Colleen Walsh at UPMC for a managerial position; Walsh, who 
ultimately became Stadtmiller’s supervisor, decided to hire Stadtmiller in November 
2007.  She explained that she was confident in his ability to succeed in this position based 
on his resume and experience, noting his strong leadership and organizational skills.  
Stadtmiller’s disabilities were not discussed during his interview.  
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 “In light of the similarities between…the ADA and RA and their implementing 
regulations, we construe and apply them in a consistent manner.”  Disabled in Action of 
Pennsylvania v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 91 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Pennsylvania Prot. and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 
402 F.3d 374, 379 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
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Stadtmiller began work at UPMC on November 19, 2007.  However, his 
responsibilities were rather limited during the first two months of his employment, as he 
was mainly shadowing other managers to learn what his new position entailed.  As he 
began completing more substantial assignments, his supervisor noted immediate 
problems.  In particular, he had trouble completing tasks, required close monitoring, 
made frequent errors, and was inattentive. 
As a result, on March 31, 2008, Walsh met with Stadtmiller and gave him a 
document titled, “Orientation Period Performance Warning,” informing him that 
“[f]ailure to show immediate and sustained improvement [would] result in termination.”  
(App. 370a-71a.)  This document detailed his shortcomings and listed three immediate 
performance requirements: Stadtmiller was to maintain focus during meetings, complete 
accurate and timely assignments, and pay attention to detail.  Stadtmiller signed the 
document. 
Although the exact date is unclear, sometime around then, Stadtmiller notified 
UPMC of his disabilities and made the following requests for accommodation: (1) a 
flexible schedule to attend doctor appointments, (2) permission to use a voice recorder 
because of his hand injury, and (3) an isolated work environment.  Stadtmiller’s third 
request was rather ambiguous, however.  In particular, he inquired about an office with a 
door, but expressed concerns about feeling socially isolated.  Additionally, according to 
Stadtmiller a human resources representative informed him that the only available space 
belonged to a different department.  (See App. 869a). Nevertheless, UPMC extended the 
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length of his cubicle wall.
2
  Stadtmiller concedes that UPMC permitted him to use a voice 
recorder, afforded scheduling flexibility, and provided a modified cubicle.  His 
supervisors testified that they were never told by Stadtmiller, or anyone else, that the 
provided accommodations were inadequate.  After these accommodations were provided, 
Walsh monitored Stadtmiller and concluded that his performance had not improved and 
did not meet the standard of the department.  Accordingly, she decided to terminate 
Stadtmiller, effective May 15, 2008.
3
 
Stadtmiller filed a complaint against UPMC for discrimination under the ADA and 
RA, along with several other causes of action related to his termination.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of UPMC on all claims.  Stadtmiller now 
appeals the District Court’s judgment with respect to his claims under the ADA and RA.4 
II. 
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we apply the same 
standard that the district court applied.  Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citing Dilworth v. Metro. Ins. Co., 418 F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Thus, we 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and affirm only when 
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and…the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).   
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 His former co-worker, who occupied a neighboring cubicle, also stated that 
Stadtmiller’s cubicle was located in a low-traffic area, which was only passed by a few 
employees also located in the same passageway. 
3
 Stadtmiller was not replaced after he was terminated; his responsibilities were absorbed 
by other employees within the department.   
4
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. 
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, an employee 
must show that he (1) is disabled, (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer, and 
(3) has suffered an adverse employment action as a result of his disability.  Hohider v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Williams v. 
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
Discrimination under the ADA includes failing to reasonably accommodate “the 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability” unless the individual’s employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”  Williams, 380 F.3d at 
761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).  Reasonable accommodation “includes the 
employer’s reasonable efforts to assist the employee and to communicate with the 
employee in good faith, under what has been termed a duty to engage in the interactive 
process.”  Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  To show that an employer 
breached its duty to engage in the interactive process, the employee must demonstrate 
that:  
(1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; (2) the employee 
requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; (3) the 
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking 
accommodations; and (4) the employee could have been reasonably 
accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith. 
Id. at 772 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319-20 (3d Cir. 
1999)). 
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We agree with the District Court’s conclusions that UPMC did not breach its duty 
to engage in the interactive process and that Stadtmiller failed to establish that the 
accommodations he requested, even if reasonable and feasible, would have rendered him 
qualified to perform his job duties.  After Stadtmiller eventually disclosed his disabilities 
to UPMC, representatives of UPMC met with Stadtmiller to discuss his disabilities and 
requests for accommodation.  The record indicates that Stadtmiller requested, and was 
provided with, three accommodations: (1) scheduling flexibility, (2) a voice recorder, and 
(3) modifications to his workspace. 
On this record, we can confidently conclude as a matter of law that UPMC made a 
good faith effort to engage in the interactive process in accommodating Stadtmiller’s 
disabilities.  See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“All the interactive process requires is that employers make a good-faith effort to seek 
accommodations.”) (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317).  In particular, upon learning of 
Stadtmiller’s disabilities, UPMC met with him to discuss what accommodations he might 
need, quickly responded to his requests, ensured that his requests had been fulfilled, and 
detailed what he needed to do to improve his performance to meet the standard of his 
department.  Therefore, we agree that Stadtmiller failed to raise a material question of 
fact regarding UPMC’s good faith participation in the accommodation process and that it 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Moreover, Stadtmiller asserts that had UPMC afforded him an office, a higher 
cubicle partition, controllable lighting, or a more isolated work space, he would have met 
expectations.  The District Court concluded that Stadtmiller raised no genuine dispute as 
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to his competence even with these accommodations he sought.  We agree for 
substantially the reasons stated by the District Court.  In support of his contention that an 
office and controllable lighting would have eliminated his performance deficiencies, 
Stadtmiller offers nothing but his résumé and his own conclusory assertions that 
accommodations like the ones requested helped him succeed in his post-injury military 
positions.  Accordingly, he did not demonstrate a necessary element of his prima facie 
Title I claim and thus the District Court did not err when it granted UPMC’s motion for 
summary judgment.   
IV. 
We have considered all other arguments made by the parties on appeal and 
conclude that they are without merit.  Having reviewed all evidence in the light most 
favorable to Stadtmiller, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of UPMC. 
